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Japan’s international peace 
operations in South Sudan: 




After the independence of South Sudan from Sudan on 9 July 2011, the 
Japanese government decided to dispatch its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) 
to South Sudan under the auspices of the United Nations Mission in the 
Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Despite the post-conf lict military 
clashes in South Sudan, the Japanese government did not withdraw the SDF, 
but instead, the Abe administration assigned a new mission, the so-called 
‘kaketsuke-keigo’ (‘rush and rescue’), to rescue staff of international 
organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGO) in preparation 
for possible armed attacks during peacekeeping operations. The new 
mission can be regarded as Prime Minister Abe’s ‘proactive contribution to 
peace’ (proactive pacifism) in action, and the policy is congruous with the 
purpose of ‘human security’ and ‘protection of civilians’. This paper aims 
to investigate Japan’s contribution to peacekeeping operations in South 
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Sudan and examine associated dilemmas facing the United Nations, the 
Japanese government, and the Japanese peacekeepers in UNMISS – which 
need to be overcome for future international peace operations.
Keywords: Japanese government, kaketsuke-keigo, Peace and Security 
Legislation, peacekeeping operations (PKOs), protection of civilians 
(POC), United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)
Introduction
This paper examines Japan’s contribution to the international peacekeeping 
operations (PKO) in South Sudan. Since the enactment of the Act on 
Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other 
Operations, or the so-called ‘PKO Law’, in 1992, the Japanese government 
has contributed to a range of international peace operations authorised or 
supported by the United Nations. After the independence of South Sudan 
from Sudan on 9 July 2011, Japan under the reign of the Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ) administration decided to dispatch its Self-Defence Forces 
(SDF) to South Sudan with the stated goal of peacekeeping and nation-
building of the newest country in the world under the auspices of the United 
Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (MOFA 2011a).
The security situation in South Sudan has not always been stable, and 
military clashes have sporadically erupted from time to time. Despite 
the outbreak of military clashes, especially the occurrence of violence in 
Juba in July 2016, the Japanese government led by Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe did not withdraw the SDF, but instead, assigned a new mission, the 
so-called ‘kaketsuke-keigo’ (‘rush and rescue’) to rescue staff of international 
organisations or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in case of 
possible armed attacks during peacekeeping operations. The addition of 
the new mission was based on the Peace and Security Legislation enacted 
by the Abe government in September 2015.
This article attempts to analyse and shed light on the  notions of ‘human 
security’, ‘protection of civilians’ (POC), and ‘kaketsuke-keigo’ as key 
analytical concepts. The concept of ‘human security’ was proposed by 
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the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994, and the 
Japanese government has promoted the realisation of the concept as one 
of the diplomatic pillars. The human security concept embraces two types 
of freedom: ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’. The Japanese 
government has contributed to human security of post-conf lict countries 
through financial contribution (freedom from want) and peacekeeping 
operations (freedom from fear) (e.g. Akimoto 2013).
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) currently tends to authorise 
‘use of force’ in terms of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) and POC in 
peacekeeping operations. The R2P mandate is regarded as one of ‘the most 
significant normative advances’ of UNPKO (Thakur 2007), and the POC 
mandate is connected with the R2P concept. It is noteworthy that ‘use 
of force’ based on the POC mandate has been authorised by the UNSC 
in almost all of the recent peacekeeping operations in Africa (Shinoda 
2012:15; Inoue 2012:72–73). Nevertheless, it seems that the POC mandates 
are ‘extremely challenging’ and difficult to implement in the military 
operations (Breidlid and Lie 2011; Willmot 2016). It was with regard to the 
POC mandate that the Abe government decided to send a kaketsuke-keigo 
mission to South Sudan. 
This paper focuses on dilemmas in the peacekeeping operations in South 
Sudan in relation with the POC mandate. To this end, this research conducts 
an analysis of the complicated dilemmas at three levels, 1) international, 
2) national, and 3) individual, originally proposed as an analytical 
framework to examine causes of war (Waltz 2001). In an application of 
the three-level perspectives, this article seeks to analyse endeavours as 
well as dilemmas of the United Nations, the Japanese government, and the 
Japanese peacekeepers in the UNMISS operation by examining official 
Japanese government documents, Japanese and international newspapers, 
and on-site reports by Japanese peacekeepers.
Accordingly, this article begins with Japan’s response to the peacekeeping 
operations in South Sudan. From an ‘international-level’ perspective, 
peacekeeping and civilian protection dilemmas, which the United Nations 
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has been faced with, will be examined in relation to Japan’s policy on 
UNMISS. From a ‘national-level’ perspective, the domestic debate on 
the new mission, kaketsuke-keigo, will be discussed with a focus on the 
political dilemmas of the Japanese government. From an ‘individual-
level’ perspective, this paper analyses personal dilemmas of the Japanese 
peacekeepers in UNMISS by examining on-site experience and daily reports 
by the Japanese peacekeepers. Finally, it will consider the implication 
of Prime Minister Abe’s ‘proactive contribution to peace’ for Japan’s 
peacekeeping operations in South Sudan for the purpose of overcoming 
the three-level dilemmas for future international peacekeeping operations.
The DPJ Government and peacekeeping operations in 
South Sudan, 2011–2012
Japan’s commitment to peacekeeping operations in South Sudan dates back 
to the period of the DPJ government (September 2009 – December 2012). 
In a meeting with Prime Minister Naoto Kan on 8 August 2011, UN 
Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon stated that the United Nations 
expected Japan to contribute to UNMISS. In response, during his meeting 
with the UNSG on 21 September 2011, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, 
successor to Prime Minister Kan, mentioned that the Japanese government 
intended to support UNMISS. Moreover, Prime Minister Noda delivered 
a speech at the UN General Assembly and stated that Japan planned to 
dispatch the SDF to UNMISS after the investigation in South Sudan. 
On 15 November 2011, the DPJ government decided to dispatch two SDF 
personnel to UNMISS as staff officers. It was decided that the unarmed 
Japanese staff officers would work as a logistic officer at the logistics 
planning office and a database manager in the joint mission analysis centre 
at the UNMISS headquarters (MOFA 2011b).
Based on the Cabinet decision of 11 November 2011, two staff officers were 
dispatched to Juba on 28 November 2011. As well as the two staff officers 
who were already sent to the UNMISS headquarters, the DPJ government 
decided to send an engineering unit composed of about 330 SDF personnel 
to UNMISS in order to improve infrastructure, such as maintenance 
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and repair of roads and buildings. Also, another engineering unit that 
consisted of 40 SDF personnel was sent to South Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya 
to support transportation and supply in the areas (MOFA 2011c).
The decision to dispatch the SDF to UNMISS was made on the basis of the 
ceasefire between Sudan and South Sudan. Nonetheless, on the morning 
of 26 March 2012, it was reported that military clashes between Sudan and 
South Sudan had broken out, and military forces of South Sudan occupied 
a major oil mine in the Heglig area, which is located inside the territory of 
Sudan. On the next day, the Sudanese government dropped bombs on an oil 
mine of South Sudan as retaliation. The UNSC, on 27 March 2012, issued a 
press statement to demand that both Sudan and South Sudan refrain from 
escalating the military clashes into another full-blown military conf lict. 
On 28 March 2012, the DPJ government expressed its concern about the 
‘military clashes’ on the border region, and called on both governments 
to settle the issue by peaceful means (MOFA 2012a). The military clashes 
indicate that ‘oil’ was a crucial factor to the border conf lict between Sudan 
and South Sudan (Hamilton 2012).
On 24 April 2012, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African 
Union held a ministerial meeting and issued a Communique on the 
arrangement which required Sudan and South Sudan to cease their 
adversarial behaviour within 48 hours with a view to reducing the bilateral 
military tension. Moreover, the UNSC adopted a resolution based on the 
PSC Communique demanding the two governments cease hostilities and 
provocations including bombing, withdraw their armed forces from each 
other, and start negotiations under the leadership of the African Union on 
2 May 2012. The Japanese government expressed its intention to support 
the PSC statement as well as the UNSC resolution on the next day (MOFA 
2012b).
Besides the SDF dispatch, Japan made a financial contribution to the 
‘human security’ of South Sudan. On 13 July 2012, the Japanese government 
decided to donate US$ 2.04 million as emergency grant aid in order to 
support Sudanese refugees who f led to South Sudan as a result of the 
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deterioration in the humanitarian situation in the southern part of Sudan. 
The humanitarian aid by the DPJ government was aimed at enhancing 
living conditions and basic services, such as water, healthcare, and hygiene 
in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) (MOFA 2012c).
The governments of Sudan and South Sudan decided to withdraw their 
troops from Abyei and to start negotiations over the issues including oilfields. 
On 3 September 2012, the Japanese government supported the progress in 
the negotiations based on the PSC Communique and UNSC Resolution 
2046 (MOFA 2012d). At the conclusion of the bilateral negotiations under 
the auspices of the African Union High Level Implementation Panel, both 
Sudan and South Sudan signed agreements on security arrangements, oil, 
and nationality. In response, the DPJ government welcomed the agreements 
and expressed its support for the peaceful coexistence of the two nations 
(MOFA 2012e).
Meanwhile, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2057 to renew the mandate of 
UNMISS for another year, until 15 July 2013. In response to the UNSC 
resolution, a Cabinet decision was made on 16 October 2012 to extend the 
term of the SDF dispatch to UNMISS for another year, until 31 October 
2013 (MOFA 2012f). Thus, the commitment by the United Nations to the 
international peacekeeping operations in South Sudan seemed to be active; 
and Japan under the reign of the DPJ was reactive but, based on its human 
security diplomacy, cooperative in the international peace operations. 
As a result of the 2009 general election, the Abe government, a coalition 
of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito, replaced the DPJ 
government, and Japan’s commitment to UNMISS became more active 
than the previous government.
The Abe Government and peacekeeping operations in 
South Sudan, 2013–2014
Prime Minister Abe’s policy of ‘proactive contribution to peace’ (proactive 
pacifism) was proposed in the National Security Strategy on 17 December 2013 
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(Cabinet Secretariat 2013). The ‘proactive contribution to peace’ concept is 
basically consistent with the ‘human security’ policy, and further developed 
Japan’s commitment to human security and peacekeeping operations in 
South Sudan. On the basis of its ‘proactive contribution to peace’ policy, 
the Abe government supported a decision by the Human Security Trust 
Fund to extend its financial assistance for South Sudan to US$ 321 000 in 
total as part of a project entitled, ‘Human Security in Africa: Assessment 
and Capacity Building to Promote Sustainable Peace and Development’. 
The project was designed to resolve ‘human security issues’, such as 
conf licts, poverty, environmental degradation, health problems, and 
involuntary resettlements (MOFA 2013a).
On 31 May 2013, Abe had official talks with South Sudan President Salva 
Kiir, who visited Japan to attend the Tokyo International Conference on 
African Development (TICAD), in Yokohama. President Kiir expressed 
his expectations for Japan’s contribution to infrastructure building and 
human resources development, and the prime minister stated that Japan 
would expand its peace operations to these fields and to the states of the 
Eastern and Western Equatoria (MOFA 2013b). The Abe-Kiir talks in 
TICAD exemplifies the prime minister’s ‘proactive contribution to peace’ 
diplomacy.
On 22 October 2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan announced 
that Hilde Johnson, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the 
Republic of South Sudan and the Head of UNMISS, would visit Japan from 
26 to 31 October. The main purpose of Johnson’s visit was to inspect the 
training of the SDF in preparation for peacekeeping operations in UNMISS. 
In response to the visit, the Abe government expressed its willingness to 
continue its ‘proactive contributions toward the achievement of peace and 
stability’ in South Sudan (MOFA 2013c).
On 15 December 2013 however, the security situation in South Sudan 
deteriorated due to military clashes between military forces of South Sudan 
and military groups loyal to former Vice-President Riek Machar, who was 
discharged by the President in July of that year. On 17 December 2013, 
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the government forces attacked the residence of the former Vice-President 
and detained some ministers and related suspects. From 4 January 2014, 
negotiation for a peace process was started by conf lict parties in Addis 
Ababa, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
proposed an agreement to cease adversarial conducts by the parties. The 
number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) amounted to some 923 000 
by the end of April 2014. In this context, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio 
Kishida organised a ‘ministerial meeting’ to resolve the South Sudan issues 
on 4 May 2014. Moreover, the foreign minister sent a message that the 
Abe government supported an agreement signed by the conf lict parties 
on 9 May, and Japanese peacekeepers would continue its nation-building 
operations in South Sudan (MOFA 2014a).
In response to the increased number of IDPs in South Sudan, the Abe 
government decided to extend a donation of US$ 12 million as ‘emergency 
grant aid’ through the World Food Programme, the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNHCR, the International Organisation for 
Migration, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Thus, the 
Abe administration made a financial contribution to ‘human security’ of 
South Sudan (freedom from want) in the fields of water, food, sanitation, 
health and medical care, and shelters as basic human needs of the local 
people (MOFA 2014b).
On 25 November 2014, UNSC Resolution 2187 was adopted to extend the 
mandate of UNMISS until 30 May 2015. In response, on 10 February 2015, 
the Abe government decided to extend the SDF dispatch to UNMISS for 
about six months until 31 August 2015. The extension of the SDF dispatch 
to UNMISS required the prime minister to report the change of the mission 
to the Diet in accordance with Article 7 of the PKO Law (MOFA 2015). 
Thus, Japan’s contribution to ‘human security’ of South Sudan was made 
by its ‘financial contribution’ and the peacekeeping operations, mainly 
‘engineering activities’ on the basis of Prime Minister Abe’s ‘proactive 
contribution to peace’ policy.
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The Abe Government and peacekeeping operations in 
South Sudan, 2015–2016
Despite the peacekeeping endeavour of UNMISS, it turned out that the 
United Nations and its member states failed to prevent military clashes 
and the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan including widespread killing 
of civilians and sexual assault. After the outbreak of the military clashes of 
December 2015, it was reported that serious human rights violations, such 
as sexual assault in refugee camps, continuously occurred, and the refugee 
camps were described as the ‘rape camps’ of South Sudan (AFP 2015). 
The Human Rights Watch noted in its annual report that they witnessed 
attacks on civilians, use of child soldiers, arbitrary detentions, torture, and 
enforced disappearances in 2015, while freedom of expression was violated 
in the country (Human Rights Watch 2016). Still, the Abe government 
decided to extend the SDF dispatch to UNMISS for international peace 
cooperation to 31 October 2016 (MOFA 2016a).
On the night of 8 July 2016, fighting erupted between troops on the side 
of President Salva Kiir and soldiers loyal to former Vice-President Riek 
Machar occurred in Juba, near the Parliament of South Sudan. It was 
reported that at least 272 people died in three days of military clashes 
between the two armed groups. Control of the army of South Sudan 
was fragmented along ethnic lines, and it was difficult to integrate the 
various disparate ethnically-dominated factions into a more unified and 
cooperative national army due to ethnic confrontation. Especially after 
President Kiir fired former Vice-President Machar in July 2013, it became 
almost impossible for the two dominant ethnic groups, Dinka and Nuer, 
to unite their troops (Yomiuri Shimbun Chokan 2016; Japan Times 2016a).
In the crossfire, two Chinese peacekeepers tasked with a POC mandate 
were killed, and some experts on African studies warned that it would 
escalate into another civil war. For instance, Clemence Pinaud, Assistant 
Professor of Indiana University, observed: ‘We most likely witnessed an 
acceleration … into a full-on war in Juba between the two parties’ (Japan 
Times 2016c). Meanwhile, the UNSC demanded that Kiir and Machar ‘rein 
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in their forces and end the fighting’, and shortly thereafter, the two leaders 
ordered their soldiers to cease hostilities (Japan Times 2016c).
In response to the worsened security situation, the Abe government 
decided to evacuate Japanese nationals from South Sudan. To this end, 
three Japanese Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) C-130 transport planes 
were dispatched from Komaki Air Base in Aichi Prefecture. The Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) also chartered an aeroplane to 
withdraw the JICA staff from South Sudan. Other Japanese personnel who 
were in charge of official development assistance (ODA) were transported 
by C-130 aeroplanes from Juba to Nairobi in Kenya (MOFA 2016b).
In spite of the military clashes, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga 
stated that: ‘We don’t consider that any armed conf lict as defined by the 
PKO Law has broken out in the operation area of UNMISS’ (Japan Times 
2016b, 2016d; MOFA 2016b). Moreover, Defence Minister Gen Nakatani 
decided not to withdraw the SDF pe
rsonnel from South Sudan, explaining that the situation was ‘not one that 
should be classified as an armed conf lict’ and that no direct attack against 
the seventh division dispatched from Chitose Air Base in Hokkaido was 
conducted (Japan Times 2016d).
On 17 July 2016, The Japan Times described the security situation of South 
Sudan as ‘the anarchy of war’. The United Nations announced that the ‘war-
torn nation’ was in danger of a ‘hunger catastrophe’, and the World Food 
Program also warned that the ‘latest conf lict is going to push even more 
people into hunger and despair’ (Japan Times 2016e). Although Defence 
Minister Nakatani stated that the situation in South Sudan did not ‘fall 
under the category of armed conf lict’ in terms of the PKO Law, as both 
conf lict groups stopped their skirmishes, the report by The Japan Times 
noted that order within the country ‘has yet to be restored, with fighters 
reportedly engaging in looting’ (Japan Times 2016f).
Among the military assaults in 2016, the rampage in the Terrain Hotel in 
Juba on 11 July was the most problematic incident for the United Nations 
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in terms of the POC mandate. Despite the occurrence of violence in the 
capital city of South Sudan, the United Nations was not able to crack down 
on the military clashes, and it was reported that the UN peacekeepers 
‘ignored rape and assault of aid workers’ (The Guardian 2016). It was 
stressed that the South Sudanese soldiers killed a local journalist, targeted 
aid workers, beat and robbed people, raped several female foreigners, 
especially Americans. It was also testified that no embassies, including the 
embassy of the United States, responded to the desperate calls for help. 
In addition, UN peacekeepers from Ethiopia, China, and Nepal refused to 
rescue and protect the civilians in Juba (The Guardian 2016).
In order to strengthen the UNMISS mission, the UNSC decided to increase 
the number of peacekeepers from 12 000 to 17 000 troops, based on UNSC 
Resolution 2304 adopted on 12 August 2016. Among them, 4 000 troops 
were planned to be deployed as the ‘Regional Protection Force’ authorised 
by Resolution 2304. The establishment of the Regional Protection Force 
was heralded as a sign that the United Nations was ‘finally getting serious 
about protecting South Sudan’s civilians’ (Helms 2016; United Nations 
2016). However, the incident of the Terrain Hotel simply indicates the 
dilemma of the POC mandate in UNPKO. Simply put, the ‘POC mandate’ in 
international peacekeeping operations is not necessarily successful as with 
the case of UNMISS. This is the limitation and dilemma of international 
peace operations authorised by the UNSC.
The ‘New Mission’ of Japanese peacekeepers under the 
Abe Administration
In the case of Japan’s PKO policy, Japanese peacekeepers were not officially 
assigned to conduct such a mission as ‘protection of civilians’. The 
Japanese peacekeepers in UNMISS stayed in a safe area, and therefore, did 
not conduct the POC mandate. Yet, UNSG Special Representative Hilde 
Johnson complained that ‘the SDF cannot be deployed to dangerous zones, 
while Koreans are dispatched to unstable areas such as Jonglei’ in July 2013 
(Fukushima 2014). Indeed, the security situation in Jonglei was unstable 
(Breidlid and Lie 2011), and the Japanese government decided to dispatch 
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the SDF to Juba without the POC mission. Still, the 2015 Peace and Security 
Legislation legitimatised a new rescue mission of the SDF for civilians in 
peacekeeping operations. On 15 November 2016, the Abe government 
made a Cabinet decision to dispatch the eleventh contingent of the SDF 
engineering unit with the new mission to South Sudan. In accordance with 
the Cabinet decision, the SDF personnel were officially allowed to conduct 
kaketsuke-keigo missions to help UN or NGO staff under attack in the midst 
of peace operations in South Sudan (Mainichi Shimbun 2016a).
In the light of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution which forbids ‘use of 
force’ in international conf lict resolution, it was considered that the new 
mission, kaketsuke-keigo, could be regarded as ‘unconstitutional’, if the SDF 
ends up in directing weapons against ‘a state or quasi-state organization’ 
(Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security 2014). 
To legitimatise the new mission, the Abe government enacted the Peace 
and Security Legislation. In addition, the concept of ‘kaketsuke-keigo’ 
technically includes not only the ‘protection of civilians’, but also the 
protection of ‘foreign soldiers’ in the same peacekeeping operations in a 
broader sense (e.g. Akimoto 2016).
Although the expansion of peacekeeping missions by the SDF aroused 
public concerns, the Abe government argued that it made sure that 
‘appropriate limits are in place’ (Japan Times 2016g). Indeed, as a coalition 
partner of the LDP, Komeito, a pacifist political party supported by a 
Buddhist organization, contended that the new mission was designed to 
rescue those defined as ‘civilians’ such as UN personnel and NGO staff 
working in South Sudan, but not to protect those defined as ‘soldiers’ of 
other countries that can defend themselves in principle. Natsuo Yamaguchi 
as Chief Representative of Komeito argued that Japan’s contribution 
should be based on the ‘Five Principles’ of Japan’s PKO participation: 
1) ‘ceasefire’ between conf lict parties, 2) ‘acceptance’ by the conf lict parties, 
3) ‘neutrality’, 4) ‘withdrawal’ when the three conditions are not met, and 
5) ‘minimum necessary use of weapons’. Yamaguchi also highlighted that 
even if the Five Principles are satisfied, the Japanese government should 
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withdraw the SDF in case of the degradation of security in South Sudan 
(Komei Shimbun 2016).
Thus, the dilemma of the Japanese government stems from the relationship 
between Article 9 of the Constitution and the kaketsuke-keigo mission 
related to the POC mandate in the UNMISS operation. Even after the 
addition of the new mission, however, the Japanese peacekeepers were 
and remained unable to conduct the kaketsuke-keigo activities for other 
peacekeepers. In addition to the issue of the new mission, Defence Minister 
Tomomi Inada was forced to resign from the Cabinet on 27 July 2017 due to 
‘allegations of a cover-up of SDF’s South Sudan mission logs’ (Japan Times 
2017b). The resignation of the defence minister symbolises the national-
level dilemma regarding Japan’s commitment to the UN peacekeeping 
operations in South Sudan. Simply put, the national-level dilemma was 
caused by constitutional limitations on the SDF, which is not a formal 
military organisation.
Individual dilemmas of the Japanese Peacekeepers in 
South Sudan
As with the case of the national-level dilemma, it can be argued that the SDF 
members were faced with individual-level dilemmas. As examined before, 
the Japanese peacekeepers could have been forced to make a decision to 
direct fire against those who intended to attack them during the UNMISS 
operation. Regarding this issue, Shigeru Suzuki pointed out that overseas 
missions would increase the mental burden on SDF personnel even in post-
conf lict peace operations (Suzuki 2015:111).  In fact, it has been reported 
that 56 SDF members, who were sent to post-war international missions in 
Iraq and the Indian Ocean, committed suicide after the overseas dispatch 
(NHK 2015).
With the addition of the new mission mandate, Japanese peacekeepers 
conducted special training in the use weapons and brought wearable 
cameras on their helmets in order to prove that their shootings were 
legally justifiable (Mainichi Shimbun 2016c). Nevertheless, if a Japanese 
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peacekeeper kills a civilian by mistake, ‘there are no rules to punish him 
for committing the crime of professional negligence … leaving him in legal 
limbo’ (Mainichi Shimbun 2016c). This was the most serious individual-
level dilemma of Japanese peacekeepers with the kaketsuke-keigo mission in 
South Sudan.
On 19 November 2016, SDF personnel as the eleventh contingent conducted 
a kick-off ceremony in Aomori City prior to the dispatch to South Sudan. 
The family members of the SDF, including their children and a wife with a 
baby, attended the ceremony, but reportedly, mass media were not allowed to 
report the feelings of the family members paying attention to their ‘mental 
burden’, and it was reported that there was a ‘tension’ in the atmosphere 
of the ceremony. On the same day in the city, there was a demonstration 
opposing the SDF dispatch to South Sudan (Mainichi Shimbun 2016b).
With the addition of the new peacekeeping mission to the SDF in UNMISS, 
the Ministry of Defence made a decision to increase ‘condolence money’ 
from 60 million yen to 90 million yen in case Japanese peacekeepers pass 
away in the line of duty. It was also decided that 8 000 yen as an additional 
allowance shall be paid to the SDF staff, each time they conduct ‘kaketsuke-
keigo’ (Asahi Shimbun 2016). Although there were opposing opinions 
inside the Japanese government arguing that the increase of condolence 
money might make the public more wary of the risk of the new mission 
mandate, some official of the Ministry of Defence insisted on the necessity 
of increasing the allowance explaining that the SDF would conduct risky 
and dangerous activities in accordance with the new mission (Asahi 
Shimbun 2016).
In the meanwhile, Japanese peacekeepers in South Sudan may well have 
faced stressful and difficult missions. For example, a Japanese peacekeeper 
told a reporter of Mainichi Shimbun that the SDF contingents in UNMISS 
tried to reduce their mental stress by deliberately overturning a table. 
The Japanese peacekeepers in the UNMISS operation were in a difficult 
environment where the temperature was over 40℃ (Mainichi Shimbun 
2012). Captain Takuhiko Hosokawa, who worked as an information staff 
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officer of UNMISS, noted that ‘there are only a few paved roads in Juba. 
Many of the roads around the city are not surfaced’. As for safety, it was 
reported that ‘there are intertribal conf licts over cows and bordering 
issues with Sudan’, although ‘the situation in Juba is stable’ (Secretariat 
of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters 2012a). Lieutenant 
Yoshitaka Hashimura described the security situation in Juba as ‘improving’ 
and ‘stable’, and noted that ‘I was never put in danger during my three 
months stay there’ in his on-site report in April 2012 (Secretariat of the 
International Peace Cooperation Headquarters 2012b). Captain Nobuhiro 
Arai noted the difficulty of the engineering and construction tasks during 
the rainy season in South Sudan. Due to the heavy rain in the season, 
the engineering unit needed to reschedule their operations repeatedly 
(Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters 2012c). 
Major Yuichiro Koma who worked as a logistics officer in UNMISS noted 
in his on-site report that there were no ‘serious violent crimes’ or ‘criminal 
activities’ in Juba except for minor offences, such as theft, yet he refrained 
from walking outside at night and going to the ‘off-limits areas’ designated 
by the United Nations (Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation 
Headquarters 2012d).
The on-site reports above are public and official statements, but some 
Japanese peacekeepers might have gone through stressful and traumatic 
experience during their missions in South Sudan, which might have 
been left unsaid. According to an interview by Mainichi Shimbun, about 
20 SDF, who were dispatched to peacekeeping operations in South Sudan 
and witnessed traumatic scenes during the operations, would need special 
medical treatment for post-traumatic syndrome disorder (PTSD) (Mainichi 
Shimbun 2017b). The necessity of special trauma counselling for former 
Japanese peacekeepers who were sent to UNMISS indicates the untold 
individual dilemmas of the SDF staff. The true feelings of the Japanese 
peacekeepers regarding negative aspects in the UNMISS operation were 
not officially expressed in their daily reports.
Nevertheless, it was disclosed that some daily reports of the Japanese 
peacekeepers involved in the UNMISS operation described aggravated 
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situations in South Sudan under the term ‘combat’. The Japanese 
government, however, explained that it was not ‘combat’ or armed conf lict, 
but ‘shooting cases’ or military clashes. Indeed, some parts of the report 
were covered in ‘black ink’ in order to conceal specific contents of their 
experience and activities (Mainichi Shimbun 2017a). Furthermore, a 
Japanese peacekeeper who was sent to the UNMISS operation committed 
suicide right after he returned from South Sudan in April 2017 (Shimbun 
Akahata 2017). The individual-level perspectives offer an insight into 
the individual dilemmas and mental stress of the Japanese peacekeepers, 
although they signify at the same time Japan’s proactive contribution to the 
peacekeeping operations for human security of the people in South Sudan.
The implication of Japan’s ‘Proactive Contribution to 
Peace’ policy
So far, it has been argued that the United Nations, the Japanese government, 
and the Japanese peacekeepers were confronted with international, 
national, and individual dilemmas in the peacekeeping operations in 
South Sudan. The existence of the dilemmas, however, does not mean that 
UNMISS, the Japanese government, and the Japanese peacekeepers were 
not contributive to peacekeeping/nation-building operations in South 
Sudan. On the contrary, the Japanese peacekeepers in cooperation with the 
United Nations made a significant contribution to the international peace 
operations, especially in the field of ‘engineering activities’ in South Sudan. 
The engineering operations by the Japanese peacekeepers can be assessed 
in terms of ‘engineering peace’ of South Sudan (Boutellis and Smith 2014).
Some analysts pointed out that Japan’s contribution to peacekeeping 
operations in Africa, especially South Sudan, could have been motivated by 
realistic and strategic reasons based on national interests or international 
prestige (Saraiva 2013; Pajon 2017). Regardless of the realistic motivation 
or ‘proactive contribution to peace’ ideal, the Japanese peacekeepers 
were appreciated by an orphanage in Juba and were highly praised by the 
President of Juba University for contribution to peacebuilding operations 
and cultural exchange with the local people through the ‘Sports for Peace’ 
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and ‘Nebuta Festival’ in March 2017 (Secretariat of the International 
Peace Cooperation Headquarters 2017a). In this context, the Japanese 
peacekeepers were ordered to withdraw from South Sudan by the end of 
May 2017 (MOD 2017a). The Japanese peacekeepers completed withdrawal 
from South Sudan, and safely returned to Aomori Airport on 27 May 2017 
(Japan Times 2017a).
Since the kaketsuke-keigo mission was added in the end of 2016 and was 
terminated by the end of May 2017, evidence regarding the implication of 
the Peace and Security Legislation for Japan’s peace operations in South 
Sudan seems to be as yet unclear, but Prime Minister Abe at least succeeded 
in implementing the legislation at a policy level to UNPKO though for a 
short period. In addition, Japan’s commitment to UNMISS amounted 
to more than five years, and the ‘engineering activities’ in South Sudan 
(five years and six months) were the longest ever in the history of Japan’s 
peacekeeping cooperation among other engineering missions in Cambodia 
(about one year), East Timor (about two years and three months), and 
in Haiti (about three years) (Secretariat of the International Peace 
Cooperation Headquarters 2017b).
Moreover, Japan’s contribution to road repair in South Sudan was two 
times larger than the road repair in Cambodia, and Japan’s contribution 
to building construction in South Sudan was four times larger than the 
building construction in Haiti (MOD 2017b:5). In response to Japan’s 
decision to withdraw the SDF from UNMISS, President Kiir expressed 
his personal gratitude toward Prime Minister Abe and the Japanese 
government for the contribution to the nation-building in South Sudan 
through the official development assistance and peacekeeping operations 
(MOD 2017b:5). Thus, although the Abe government eventually withdrew 
the SDF from UNMISS, its contribution to the peacekeeping operations for 
South Sudan under the policy of ‘proactive contribution to peace’ can be 
regarded as measurable and meaningful.
Through the analysis of the three-level dilemmas, lessons in the UNMISS 
operation are summarised as follows. First, it is significant for the United 
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Nations to strengthen the peacekeeping forces so that there exists ‘peace’ to 
maintain. Also, it is necessary for the UN peacekeepers to cooperate with 
the Regional Protection Force in the case of UNMISS. Second, the Japanese 
government needs to explain the importance of the kaketsuke-keigo mission 
in UNPKO so that the SDF can properly conduct such a mission in future. 
For this reason, further military training and special trauma counselling 
for Japanese peacekeepers should be provided by the Ministry of Defence. 
Japanese peacekeepers might be able to train for the POC mandate with 
other UN peacekeepers from Asian countries, such as China, South Korea, 
and India, but the kaketsuke-keigo mission shall be limited to a safe place in 
accordance with the Peace and Security Legislation.
Conclusion
This paper has examined Japan’s commitment to the international 
peacekeeping operations in UNMISS in terms of the dilemmas of the 
United Nations, the Japanese government, and the Japanese peacekeepers 
responding to the changing security situation in South Sudan. Through the 
analysis of the three-level perspectives, it was confirmed that the United 
Nations, the Japanese government, and the Japanese peacekeepers were 
respectively confronted with political and personal dilemmas related to the 
peacekeeping operations including the POC mandate in UNMISS.
Internationally, it was revealed that peace operations of the United Nations 
are not necessarily effective in the maintenance of solid ‘ceasefire’. In the 
case of South Sudan, the fighting parties are not only countries but also 
different ethnic groups. In this situation, the international community 
did not recognise the military clashes inside South Sudan as a violation 
of ceasefire. This is why the UNSC did not withdraw the UN peacekeepers 
from South Sudan, even after the sporadic but serious military clashes. 
In this context, the UN peacekeepers failed to protect the local people 
and humanitarian aid workers in Juba in July 2016. Although the UNSC 
decided to increase the number of peacekeepers to strengthen UNMISS, the 
POC mission still remains a difficult and challenging military operation. 
It became clear that the POC mission authorised with ‘use of force’ is the 
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international-level dilemma of UNPKO, which is supposed to be conducted 
under ‘ceasefire’.
Domestically, the Abe government added a new mission, ‘kaketsuke-
keigo’ to the SDF, in spite of the military clashes and the worsening 
security situation in South Sudan. The new mission used to be suspected 
as ‘unconstitutional’ in terms of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, 
but it was legitimatised by the enactment of the 2015 Peace and Security 
Legislation. The Japanese peacekeepers became legally capable of rescuing 
‘civilians’, especially staff of international organisations in the UNMISS 
operation. Still, the Abe government decided not to conduct the mission 
to rescue peacekeeping ‘soldiers’ of other countries in the UNMISS case, 
although it is legally feasible under the Peace and Security Legislation. 
Yet, the Abe government ended in withdrawing the SDF from UNMISS 
earlier, and Defence Minister Inada was forced to resign from the Cabinet 
due to the issue related to Japan’s peace operations in UNMISS. This is the 
national-level dilemma of the Japanese government which is constrained 
by Article 9 of the Constitution.
From an individual-level perspective, it was an obvious dilemma for 
Japanese peacekeepers to conduct the new mission, kaketsuke-keigo, in the 
UNMISS operation. Likewise, personal dilemmas recorded in the on-site 
reports by the Japanese peacekeepers in South Sudan and reported by 
Japanese and international newspapers were scrutinised. It turned out that 
the Japanese peacekeepers who provided official statements did not note 
that the security situation in South Sudan, especially Juba, was dangerous. 
Yet, it was revealed that their peacekeeping operations in the country 
were difficult, stressful, and even traumatic in various ways as shown in 
the daily reports and newspapers. The new mission could have increased 
the risk of the Japanese peacekeepers, and might have led to a nightmare 
scenario where they would need to direct fire against other people or be 
shot to death. This is the individual-level dilemma in self-defence measures 
during their peacekeeping operations. 
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Therefore, it is significant for the United Nations, the Japanese 
government, and Japanese peacekeepers to overcome the dilemmas related 
to international peacekeeping operations in future. In particular, it is 
imperative for the United Nations to strengthen the peacekeeping forces 
so a ‘ceasefire’ and ‘peace’ exist and are to be maintained. The Japanese 
government needs to explain the necessity of the kaketsuke-keigo mission 
in relation to the POC mandate in UNPKO. In addition, proper military 
training and special  trauma counselling for Japanese peacekeepers should 
be provided. Despite the dilemmas and difficulties at the three levels, the 
Japanese peacekeepers contributed to ‘human security’ and ‘engineering 
peace’ in South Sudan, and the Japanese government will need to continue 
further commitment for the nation-building of South Sudan under the 
policy of ‘human security’ and ‘proactive contribution to peace’.
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